In Re Mackin: Is the Application of the Political Offense Exception an Extradition Issue for the Judicial or Executive Branch? by Imbalzano, Maria P.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 5, Issue 2 1981 Article 12
In Re Mackin: Is the Application of the
Political Offense Exception an Extradition
Issue for the Judicial or Executive Branch?
Maria P. Imbalzano∗
∗
Copyright c©1981 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
In Re Mackin: Is the Application of the
Political Offense Exception an Extradition
Issue for the Judicial or Executive Branch?
Maria P. Imbalzano
Abstract
The purpose of this Note is to examine the opinions of the magistrate and court of appeals in In
re Mackin, regarding the issue of whether the courts have jurisdiction to determine the applicability
of the political offense exception. Part I of this Note will analyze the language of the applicable
extradition statute and will compare the courts’ interpretation with that of the government of the
United States. Part II will attempt to resolve the jurisdictional issue by examining the language of
the political offense exception in recent treaties. Part III will discuss the constitutional effect of
the political question doctrine on the determination of the threshold issue by the courts.
IN RE MACKIN: IS THE APPLICATION OF THE
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION AN EXTRADITION
ISSUE FOR THE JUDICIAL OR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH?
INTRODUCTION
On October 6, 1980, Desmond Mackin, a native of Northern
Ireland, was arrested in New York City pursuant to a provisional
arrest warrant' issued under the terms of the United States-United
Kingdom extradition treaty (Treaty) .2 The warrant was based on
an extradition complaint filed by the government of the United
Kingdom. 3  The charges resulted from a shooting incident 4 in
1. The provisional arrest warrant was issued by Honorable Irving Ben Cooper in
accordance with the terms of the Extradition Treaty between the government of the United
States and the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
which provides as follows:
(1) In urgent cases the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the
requested Party, be provisionally arrested on application through the diplomatic
channel by the competent authorities of the requesting Party. The application
shall contain an indication of intention to request the extradition of the person
sought and the statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a conviction
against that person, and, if available, a description of the person sought, and
such further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify the issue of a
warrant of arrest had the offense been committed, or the person sought been
convicted, in the territory of the requested Party.
Treaty on Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, art.VIII, 28 U.S.T.
227, 232, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. See infra note 3. The terms Great
Britain and United Kingdom are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
2. Treaty, supra note 1. "Extradition is the process whereby one state delivers to another
state, at its request, a person charged with a criminal offense against the law of the requesting
state, in order that he may be tried and/or punished." Bassiouni, International Extradition in
American Practice and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1968).
3. On November 19, 1980, a formal complaint requesting Mackin's extradition was filed
by the British government and a warrant of arrest was issued on the same day by Honorable
Richard Owen. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
1981), habeas corpus denied, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
Under federal statute, extradition proceedings are initiated when the requesting country
files a verified complaint with the nearest court having jurisdiction over the individual,
charging the fugitive with the commission of an extraditable offense as set forth in the treaty.
A federal magistrate issues a warrant for the fugitive's arrest and conducts a hearing in the
fugitive's presence to determine whether the requesting country has demonstrated that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge that the fugitive has committed the extraditable
offense. If the magistrate deems the evidence submitted by the requesting party sufficient to
establish probable cause, he orders the fugitive incarcerated and certifies the evidence and
transcripts of the hearing to the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
Review of the magistrate's decision within the judicial system is limited. The particular
decision is final and not appealable, Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920);
Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932), although the requesting country
may refile its request if extradition is denied. See 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE
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Northern Ireland between Mackin, a member of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army, 5 and a plain clothes British soldier. Mackin
ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 367-70 (1973). If the magistrate determines that the
fugitive is extraditable, however, the accused may collaterally attack the decision by filing a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976); 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33, at 1013 (1968). The only issues to be reviewed in a habeas corpus
proceeding are those relating to whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense
is enumerated in the treaty, and whether there was any evidence warranting the finding of
probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the charged offense. Garcia-Guillern v. United
States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). Habeas corpus may
not be used to rehear the findings of the magistrate. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312
(1925); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1888).
If the courts authorize extradition, the Secretary of State must independently decide
whether to deliver the accused to the requesting party. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976). The
Secretary may lawfully decline to surrender the fugitive either on the ground that the case is
not within the treaty or that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the crime charged. The
Secretary may also consider matters outside the record, such as public policy in light of
current international relations. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 334,
at 174 (1942) (citing a memorandum from Counselor Anderson of the Department of State to
Secretary of State Knox, February, 1912, Department of State File 211.42R67/16). The
executive branch has discretion to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds, if it should
appear that it would be unsafe to surrender an accused to foreign authorities. See Peroff v.
Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); In re
Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y.), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v.
Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afJ'd, 619 F.2d 167, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1980). See also
infra note 162 and accompanying text.
4. On March 16, 1978, in Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland, Desmond Mackin
and Robert Gamble were searching for Mackin's missing "people's taxi" service cab. This cab
was used for the purpose of transporting people from the Catholic neighborhoods of West
Belfast to the shopping areas in Belfast because violence had caused local transportation
services to be withdrawn. Mackin and Gamble were looking for the cab on foot in the
Rossnareen-Ramoan Gardens area when they noticed groups of men conspicuously standing
on certain street corners. Mackin claimed he knew the men were strangers to the area because
he was familiar with almost everyone in the community, at least by sight, and because the
men acted in a manner which was out of the ordinary for residents of Andersonstown. There
was also a mini-van travelling through the streets with someone inside the van taking
photographs from the window. In addition, two British Army helicopters were flying over-
head. Mackin and Gamble concluded that the strangers were British soldiers. They wished to
inform the local Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) defense units, see infra note 5,
which could properly deal with the situation, and sought the easiest way to escape the circle
of strangers being formed around them. Mackin and Gamble determined that the "weakest
link" in the group of undercover soldiers was the soldier standing at a bus stop. Mackin
approached him and asked who he was and what he was doing in the area. The soldier
recognized Mackin and Gamble as members of the PIRA. There is some question as to what
happened next and who fired at whom, but an altercation ensued in which all three received
gunshot wounds. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 8-12 & 92-95.
5. "[T]he PIRA [Provisional Irish Republican Army] is committed to the traditional goal
of Irish nationalism, the removal of British presence from Ireland and the unification of
Ireland through the use of violent means, directed, to a large extent, against the security
forces." In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 64.
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was indicted" in Great Britain on charges of attempted murder,
wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and possession of
firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life. 7
Magistrate Naomi Reice Buchwald presided over the extradi-
tion hearing, which began on February 20, 1981." The magistrate
found, initially, that the evidence submitted by the government of
the United Kingdom established probable cause 9 to believe that
6. Id. at 1. Mackin was released on bail and failed to appear for trial on September 25,
1979. A bench warrant for his arrest was issued. Id.
7. Id. The first charge, of attempted murder, is contrary to common law in Great
Britain. Id.
Murder is a Common Law offense, it is not defined by Statute. Murder is committed
"where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable
creature in being and under the King's peace, with malice aforethought either
express or implied, the death following within one year and a day. "
Post Trial Memorandum in Support of the Requested Extradition of Desmond Mackin by the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Pursuant to 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S.
8468 (1977) and 18 U.S.C. § 3184, at 9, In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981) (citing E. CoKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1572) and
J. F. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES (40th ed. 1979))
[hereinafter cited as Gov. Post Trial Memorandum].
The second charge is contrary to § 18 of the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861,
which provides:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or
cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the
lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of a felony and being
convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.
Gov. Post Trial Memorandum, supra, at 12 (citing Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24
& 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 18, amended by Statute Law Revision Act, 1892, 55 & 56 Vict., ch. 19,
246, Statute Law Revision Act (No. 2), 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 54, 227, Criminal Law Act,
1967, N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 18, § 1).
Penal servitude has been abolished by the Criminal Justice Act, 1953, N. Ir. Pub. Gen.
Acts, ch. 14, § 1.
The final charge is contrary to the Firearms Act of Northern Ireland. This Act provides:
A person shall be guilty of an offence if he has in his possession any firearm or
ammunition with intent by means thereof to endanger life or cause serious injury to
property or to enable any other person by means thereof to endanger life or cause
serious injury to property, whether any injury to person or property has been
caused or not.
Firearms Act, 1969, N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 12, § 14.
8. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 3. The appropriate inquiries for a
court to make at an extradition hearing include whether the offense charged is extraditable
under the treaty, whether the person brought before the court is the one accused of the crime,
and whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed the offense. Sayne
v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969). See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463
(1888); Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976).
9. To establish probable cause there must be sufficient evidence warranting a finding
that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty of the crimes charged. Peroff
v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir.
1969); Wacker v. Beeson [sic], 256 F. Supp. 542, 544 (E.D. La. 1966), aff'd per curiam,
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Mackin committed the offenses for which he had been indicted in
Great Britain. 10 Generally, such a finding would be sufficient to
support the requested extradition." Magistrate Buchwald ruled,
however, that the extradition of Mackin was barred because the
charged offenses were of a political character and thus fell within
the scope of the political offense exception 1 2 of the Treaty.
Counsel for the United States, on behalf of the government of
the United Kingdom,' 3 argued that the threshold issue of this case
Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1967). This standard of proof is set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3184. Under this statute, the hearing before the magistrate is held "to the end that
the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered" in order to determine whether "he
deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
.... "18 U.S.C. § 3184. The test as to whether such evidence of criminality has been
presented is in essence the same test as that for probable cause. 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERaNATIONAL LAW § 28, at 945 (1968); Application of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 291 (1933); Benson v. McMa-
hon, 127 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1888).
10. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 21.
11. See supra notes 3 & 8.
12. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42-43. This exception in Article
V(I)(c) of the Treaty expressly prohibits the surrender of persons charged with "any crime or
offense of a political character." See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 1313, 1322 (1962). For the text of the political offense exception, see infra text accompa-
nying note 79.
Prior to the nineteenth century, extradition treaties were signed for the specific purpose
of surrendering political offenders to their homeland. See Deere, Political Offenses in the
Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 249 (1933). The introduction of the
political offense exception to treaties resulted from a reversal of attitudes following the
French Revolution and the increased awareness of international world order. Cantrell, The
Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Comparison of the United States,
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 782 (1976-77). "The
historical reason for this practice was the well-founded apprehension that to surrender
political criminals would surely amount to delivering them to their summary execution or, in
any event, to the risk of being tried and punished by tribunals colored by political passion."
Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48
VA. L. REv. 1226, 1226 (1962) (footnote omitted). Because the extradition proceedings have
the character of a preliminary examination, Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. at 463; Peroff v.
Hylton, 563 F.2d at 1102; Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 833 (1976), the fugitive has no right to introduce evidence at the hearing which
merely contradicts the evidence supplied by the requesting Party or which only poses conflicts
of credibility. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685. The accused may only introduce evidence
which is explanatory. Id. The extent of such explanatory evidence to be received is largely in
the discretion of the magistrate but the decisions are emphatic that the extraditee may not
turn the extradition hearing into a full trial on the merits. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309,
315-17 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at
685.
13. In extradition proceedings, the requesting party is represented by the requested
government. The Treaty provides: "[t]he requested Party shall make all necessary arrange-
ments for and meet the cost of the representation of the requesting Party in any proceedings
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
was whether the court had jurisdiction to determine if the crime
charged was a "political offense" under the Treaty, or whether such
determination should be made by the executive branch. 14 On this
issue, Magistrate Buchwald held that: 1) the applicable statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3184,'1 which gives a magistrate authority to hear and
consider evidence of criminality in extradition cases, includes the
authority to determine whether the alleged offense falls within the
ambit of the "political offense exception;" 16 2) the language of the
Treaty which requires that the political offense exception be deter-
mined by the "requested Party" refers to the judiciary and not to
the executive branch;1 7 and 3) the determination made under the
political offense exception of the Treaty does not violate the "politi-
cal question doctrine," 8 because it relates only to past political fact
and not to the present political climate of the requesting country.19
The court of appeals subsequently agreed with this holding. 20
The purpose of this Note is to examine the opinions of the
magistrate and court of appeals in In re Mackin, regarding the issue
of whether the courts have jurisdiction to determine the applicabil-
ity of the political offense exception. Part I of this Note will analyze
the language of the applicable extradition statute and will compare
the courts' interpretation with that of the government of the United
States. Part II will attempt to resolve the jurisdictional issue by
examining the language of the political offense exception in the
Treaty, in view of a trend in the language of the political offense
exception in recent treaties. Part III will discuss the constitutional
effect of the political question doctrine on the determination of the
threshold issue by the courts.
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE EXTRADITION STATUTE
The foundation of the magistrate's opinion is that no precedent
supports adoption of the government's narrow reading of the extra-
arising out of a request for extradition." Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XIV(1). Consequently,
the government of the United Kingdom was represented by the United States Attorney's
Office and Mackin was represented by private counsel.
14. Brief for the United States of America, at 26, In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Gov. Brief]; In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 36.
15. See infra note 21 for text of statute.
16. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 36.
17. Id. at 40.
18. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
19. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40-41.
20. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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dition statute,2 which would limit the court's jurisdiction solely to
a determination of probable cause.2 2  In over eighty years of juris-
prudential history, the magistrate noted, the courts have never
declined to receive and consider evidence on the application of the
political offense exception. 23
A. Precedent
In the United States, the question of the courts' jurisdiction to
apply the political offense exception has arisen only twice, once in
1894 24 and again in 1981.25 In both cases the courts exercised
jurisdiction to determine the issue. 26 In Eain v. Wilkes, 7 decided
in 1981, the court stressed that it "ha[d] not found any case where
an American court declined to consider the applicability of the
political offense exception when it was squarely presented. ' 28  The
21. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 36-37. The language of 18
U.S.C. § 3184 provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States ...may, upon
complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction,
with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any
of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the
apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the
same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such
foreign government, for the surrender of such person ....
Id. (emphasis added).
22. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 36-37.
23. Id. at 37.
24. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
25. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (Oct. 18,
1981).
26. 641 F.2d at 513-17; 62 F. at 997.
27. 641 F.2d 504 (1981). In Eain, Israel sought the extradition from the U.S. of Abu
Eain, a revolutionary who was accused of planting a bomb in a crowded market place in
Tiberias, Israel. The bomb's explosion killed two young boys and injured more than 30
others. The petitioner was a member of the Al Fatah branch of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and claimed that the bombing was politically motivated. Id.
28. Id. at 513. See, e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971); Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S.
914 (1963); United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959);
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
court stated that other tribunals which have considered the applica-
bility of the political offense exception, without raising or discussing
the jurisdictional issue, have done so "presumably relying upon the
language in 18 U.S.C. § 3184."29
In Eain, the court focused on the language of section 3184 that
requires "[a] hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence 'to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty.' -30 It interpreted that portion of the statute to include "a
clause excepting political offenses [as] a 'provision' of the treaty, '" 31
and concluded, therefore, that a determination made by the magis-
trate under the political offense provision was within the scope of
the extradition hearing.32 Curiously, the magistrate in Mackin
referred to the Eain court's interpretation of the statute, but explic-
itly declined to pass on the merits of such statutory construction. 33
Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915);
In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
29. 641 F.2d at 513.
30. Id. (emphasis in original). The Eain court also argued that when the extradition
statute was originally enacted, the courts were to decide preliminarily how to apply the
political offense exception. Congress made it "a Judicial determination in the first instance as
to whether or not the country requesting extradition had charged an individual with a crime
'under the provisions of' a treaty." 641 F.2d at 513 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3184). Up until that
time, "the Executive exercised complete control over extradition without reference to the
courts." Id. n.13 (citing M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 505 (1974)). The Eain court stressed that the executive branch had endorsed this new
approach "[i]mmediately upon the statute's enactment." Id. As proof, the court cited an
Attorney General's opinion from 1843. Id. See 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 201 (1843). In that opinion,
the Attorney General concluded that the extradition treaty gave the court the power to issue
warrants for fugitives charged under the treaty and to hear evidence of criminality relating to
the charge. Id.
There is nothing in the Attorney General's opinion, however, which would lend support
to the idea that Congress intended the judiciary to apply the political offense exception.
Furthermore, since the Attorney General's opinion was actually rendered five years before
section 3184 was enacted, citation of that opinion for the proposition that the executive
branch began a policy of deference to the role of the judiciary, as mandated by Congress,
"[i]mmediately upon the statute's enactment," 641 F.2d at 513 n.13, is inappropriate.
31. 641 F.2d at 513 n.12.
32. Id. at 513.
33. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 38 n..
Magistrate Buchwald stated:
We note, without passing on the merits of such statutory construction, that the
Court in Abu Eain v. Wilkes seemed to endorse a reading of that portion of 18
U.S.C. § 3184, which requires a hearing to determine whether there is evidence "to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty," (emphasis added in
Abu Eain v. Wilkes), to mean that a clause excepting political offenses is a "provi-
sion" of the treaty and thus, that a determination made under such clause is within
the scope of the hearing contemplated by the statute.
19821
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The magistrate chose to rely solely on the outcome, rather than on
the rationale, of the Eain court's holding. 34
34. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 37-38. In supporting the
magistrate, the court of appeals in Mackin, noted the case of In re Kaine, 55 U.S. 103 (1852),
which was decided four years after the enactment of the original extradition statute. In
Kaine, the government of the United Kingdom requested the extradition of the accused for
the crime of attempted murder. Although this extradition case involved no political offense
issue, the Kaine court made the general observation that "extradition without an unbiased
hearing before an independent judiciary [is] highly dangerous to liberty, and ought never to
be allowed in this country." Id. at 113. The court of appeals in Mackin cited Kaine to
establish the intent of Congress in enacting the extradition statute. 668 F.2d at 135.
In Kaine, Justice Catron relied on the case of United States v. Robins, 27 Fed. Cas. 825
(1799). In that case, Jonathan Robins was surrendered by the United States to British naval
officers, pursuant to the extradition treaty then in existence. There was no legislation on
extradition at the time, and President Adams, believing he had control over the extradition
process, arranged for delivery of Robins to the British. This action by the President alone
apparently caused a national outcry due to the perception that Robins was an American
citizen who had been forced into military service by the British Navy and that the murder,
for which he was charged, had occurred during the course of a mutiny on board a British
vessel. See Speech of John Marshall, 10 Annals of Congress 613 (1800). The public acknow-
ledged the fact that Jonathan Robins had committed a murder, but it was significant that the
murder was committed in fleeing from an illegal impressment. The belief that Robins should
not have been extradited is analogous to the reasoning supporting the political offense
exception. Justice Catron, in In re Kaine, noted that this unfortunate event had a controlling
influence when Congress passed the Extradition Act of 1848 (Rev. Stat. § 5270). 55 U.S. at
112. From an analysis of Kaine, the court of appeals in Mackin concluded that when
Congress vested magistrates with the authority to determine whether evidence exists to
sustain a charge under the provisions of the proper treaty, "it had no intention of silently
excepting the political offense issue from the magistrates' consideration." 668 F.2d at 135.
The relevance of the Kaine decision is questionable, however. The Kaine doctrine (that
extradition without an unbiased judicial hearing is highly dangerous to liberty) is not hin-
dered in the slightest by having a magistrate preside over the extradition hearing to determine
probable cause, while also having the executive branch determine if the political offense
exception applies.
Furthermore, In re Kaine was collaterally attacked in Ex Parte Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1853), a habeas corpus proceeding. In Ex Parte Kaine, Justice Nelson stated that
decisions growing out of political offenses are best left to the executive branch because they
involve a political question. 14 Fed. Cas. at 81. Justice Nelson concluded:
The surrender, in such cases, involves a political question, which must be decided
by the political, and not by the judicial, powers of the government. It is a general
principle, as it respects political questions concerning foreign governments, that the
judiciary follows the determination of the political power, which has charge of its
foreign relations, and is, therefore, presumed to best understand what is fit and
proper for the interest and honor of the country. They are questions unfit for the
arbitrament of the judiciary-especially so for the subordinate magistrates of the
country.
Id. at 81. The court of appeals in Mackin felt Justice Nelson misunderstood the significance of
the Robins incident and that Justice Catron's interpretation of the statute represents the
sounder view. 668 F.2d at 135. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of political
offense determinations, see Part III on the political question doctrine.
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The only previous decision to address the merits of the jurisdic-
tional question regarding determination of the political offense ex-
ception was In re Ezeta,35 decided in 1894. In that case, counsel for
the Salvadoran government argued that courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to determine the political character of an offense. 3  The for-
eign government based its argument on the language of the treaty37
and the extradition statute38 then in effect. The court noted in
particular that authority was given to the President of the United
States under the extradition statute to decline to surrender a fugi-
tive to the requesting country on the ground that the case was not
within the treaty or that the evidence was not sufficient to establish
the charge of criminality.3 9 The court held that the delegation of
such authority to the President did not deprive the committing
magistrate of the jurisdiction to determine preliminarily whether
the offense was of a political character. 40  The magistrate's task was
to take all the testimony and determine its sufficiency with respect
to the offense charged. 41
35. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). Ezeta was the first judicial opinion in the United States
to consider the political offense exception. Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political
Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 391 (1979-80). In this
case the Salvadoran government sought the extradition of General Ezeta, the former presi-
dent of the Republic of Salvador, on charges of murder and robbery. These crimes were
allegedly committed during a revolution in which the fugitive was seeking to maintain the
authority of the then existing government.
36. 62 F. at 995.
37. The treaty provided that persons convicted or charged with any of the crimes
specified shall be delivered up only " 'upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the
laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his or
her apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been there committed.' " 62 F.
at 995 (quoting the extradition treaty between the United States and Republic of Salvador).
The Salvadoran government contended that the applicable provision in the treaty necessarily
excluded an inquiry into the character of the political offense by the magistrate, since there
could not be a crime of a political character under the laws of the United States unless it were
treason. Id.
38. The language of the predecessor statute of 18 U.S.C. § 3184, then applicable,
provided that any person charged with an extraditable crime under any treaty may be
arrested and brought before the magistrate "to the end that the evidence of criminality may
be heard and considered." 62 F. at 995 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 5270). Counsel claimed that this
provision limited the jurisdiction of the magistrate and "that when [the magistrate] has
received and considered the evidence of criminality of the accused as to the crime charged in
the complaint the examination is at an end." Id.
39. 62 F. at 996.
40. Id. at 996-97.
41. In an effort to illustrate judicial acceptance of the principle that the courts have
jurisdiction to determine the political offense issue, Magistrate Buchwald erroneously stated
that the court in In re Ezeta began its discussion of the political offense exception by simply
stating" '[h]aving jurisdiction to determine whether the charges against the accused are of a
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In taking jurisdiction, the Ezeta court analyzed the language
of both the statute and the treaty then in effect.42 The court
determined that the statutory phrase which gave the magistrate the
power to hear "evidence of criminality" could not be interpreted as
limiting the court's jurisdiction to decide if extradition should be
granted.43  Although the rationales of the Eain and Ezeta holdings
were distinctly different, 44 the magistrate 45 and court of appeals46
in Mackin endorsed neither approach, relying instead on the simi-
larity of result in the two cases. 47  What is certain, however, is that
political character or not, I proceed to the consideration of that question.' " In re Mackin,
No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 37 n.** (quoting In re Ezeta, 62 F. at 997). The Ezeta
court, however, discussed at length the jurisdictional issue raised by counsel for the Salva-
doran government before concluding that it had jurisdiction. See 62 F. at 995-97. See also
supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. This oversight was accepted by the court of
appeals in Mackin. 668 F.2d at 135.
42. The statute in effect at the time of Ezeta, Rev. Stat. § 5270, was enacted in 1848. It
provided:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the government of
the United States and any foreign government, any justice of the Supreme Court,
circuit judge, district judge, commissioner, authorized so to do by any of the courts
of the United States, or judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any
State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within
the limits of any State, district, or Territory, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty
or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that
he may be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.
This is similar to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3184, now in effect. See supra note 21 for text of
§ 3184.
43. 62 F. at 996. After analyzing the statute and the treaty, the court stated:
Plainly, the duty of the judicial authority is to decide whether extradition is due,
according to law and the evidence, and pursuant to the treaty. The whole case must
be considered by the magistrate, whether the questions involved arise out of the
law, the evidence, or the treaty. There is no limitation in this respect as to his
jurisdiction, and his duty is fully and accurately stated.
Id. As a matter of public policy, due to the relations of one nation with another, the court
stated that the chief executive should review extradition cases if the accused is found extradit-
able. Id. It concluded, however, that this authority does not deprive the magistrate of
jurisdiction to determine preliminarily whether the offense is political in character or not. Id.
The court further concluded that since the Constitution of the United States declares
that treaties are the supreme law of the land, the judicial branch should be able to see what
the terms of the treaty are with respect to the question under consideration. Id. Presumably,
as a result of this opinion, courts over the years have concluded that they have had jurisdic-
tion to apply the political offense exception. See, e.g., supra note 28.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 & 42-43.
45. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 37-38.
46. 668 F.2d at 135.
47. Both courts held that the judiciary has jurisdiction to determine if an offense of a
political character has been committed. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 & 35-41.
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the question of whether the court may decide the political offense
exception rests necessarily, in part, on interpretation of the lan-
guage of the statute. Both Eain and Ezeta imply this proposition.
Given the lack of agreement in the respective rationales of the two
cases, and given the Eain and Mackin courts' observations that
arguments against court determination of the political offense ex-
ception are not without merit, 48 blind allegiance to the precedent
established by the outcomes of both Eain and Ezeta is unwarranted
and improper. Instead, as these two cases suggest, statutory con-
struction should be dispositive. Accordingly, an analysis of the
language of the statute applicable in Mackin is appropriate here.
B. The Language of the Statute
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 4 provides that a magistrate
is authorized to conduct an extradition hearing "to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered." '50  If on
such hearing the magistrate considers the evidence sufficient "to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty,"'5 he
shall certify the evidence and transcripts of the hearing to the
Secretary of State.5 2 With respect to the language of the statute,
two interpretations have thus far been presented: 1) the magistrate
has jurisdiction to apply the political offense exception because this
exception is a "provision" of the Treaty, as held by the Eain court5 3
and 2) the phrase "evidence of criminality" does not suggest that the
magistrate's jurisdiction in extradition cases is limited to a determi-
nation of probable cause, as concluded in Ezeta.5 4
A third interpretation was asserted by the government in
Mackin. According to this view, there is nothing in the language of
section 3184 to indicate that the political offense issue should be
decided by the magistrate.5 5  "The statute does not refer explicitly
to political offenses, but provides generally that the extraditee be
brought before the committing justice, judge, or magistrate 'to the
48. 641 F.2d at 517; In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42; 668 F.2d at
137.




53. 641 F.2d at 513. See supra notes 30-32 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
54. 62 F. at 995-96. See supra notes 30-32 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
55. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 28.
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end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and consid-
ered.' "6 In Mackin, the government argued that "evidence of
criminality" is the operative phrase, and that this phrase refers
solely to the issue of probable cause.5 7
This construction of the statute grants the court jurisdiction to
determine only whether there was probable cause 8 to believe the
accused guilty of the crime charged and necessarily precludes any
further examination into the political offense exception by the mag-
istrate. In Charlton v. Kelly, 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld this construction, stating that an extradition proceed-
ing is not a trial in the legal sense. 0° The Court held that extradi-
tion proceedings are simply inquiries into whether sufficient evi-
dence exists to justify committing an accused to custody while
awaiting the requisition of the foreign government. 1 It concluded
that the only issue a court should resolve in extradition matters is
whether the requesting government has submitted sufficient evi-
dence to establish probable cause.62  Therefore, although the role
56. Id. at 28-29. "There exists no legislative enactment exempting political offenders
from extradition to foreign nations. The entire collection of written law concerning political
offenders is to be found in treaties negotiated between the United States and other nations."
Cantrell, supra note 12, at 794.
57. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 29.
58. See generally Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447
(1913); Bryant v. United States, 167 U.S. 104 (1897). This construction of the statute was
given in the cases cited, although the political offense exception was not at issue.
59. 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (extradition request by Italian government on complaint that
fugitive committed murder).
60. Id. at 461. The Court stated: "The proceeding is not a trial. The issue is confined to
the single question of whether the evidence for the State makes a prima facie case of guilt
sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for trial." Id. Accord Jimenez v. Aristeguieta,
311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962). "[T]he extradition proceeding is not a trial of the guilt or
innocence [of petitioner] but of the character of a preliminary examination . Id. at 556.
61. 229 U.S. at 460.
62. 229 U.S. at 460-61. There is a distinction between evidence rebutting probable
cause, which is properly admitted, and evidence in defense, which may not be admitted. Id.
The defendant may not present any evidence in the nature of a defense, such as insanity or an
alibi. Id. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970). See also Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the
American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CriM. L. & CRMINOLOGY
193, 198 (1980).
Evidence of the political nature of a crime does not fall into either category. The
political character of an offense does not rebut whether a court has probable cause to believe
the defendant committed the crime. It also cannot be used as a defense on the merits because
a determination of the political nature of a crime does not affect the guilt or innocence of a
defendant but merely serves to block his extradition. Charlton, therefore, does not explicitly
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of the judiciary in the extradition process is uniquely important,6 3
"that role is limited to the making of a determination of probable
cause."
64
Focusing on the purpose that review of the evidence is in-
tended to serve gives rise to a fourth interpretation. Section 3184
provides that the magistrate must deem the evidence of criminality
"sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty."65  Logically to "sustain the charge," all that would be
required is evidence sufficient to establish probable cause that the
crime had been committed. The political character of the offense is
not relevant to whether the evidence "sustains" the charge, because
the political offense provision is an exception to extradition and not
a defense on the merits of the charge.66
The language of the treaty should also be interpreted in light of
the phrase "charge under the provisions of the treaty. '6 7  The
charges available under the treaty are set forth in the Schedule of
Offenses68 referred to in Article III of the Treaty and are not listed
in the political offense exception. Contrary to the Eain court's
interpretation of this phrase,69 these words were intended only to
focus attention on whether the offense charged is enumerated in the
Schedule of Offenses. The language of the statute should therefore
not be construed to give courts unlimited jurisdiction to decide
whether extradition is due, "according to law and the evidence,
and pursuant to the treaty," as stated in Ezeta.70
forbid such evidence. The Supreme Court, however, in Charlton, appears to place emphasis
on only receiving that which falls into the category of evidence rebutting probable cause. See
infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. The more evidence that is received on additional
issues, the closer the proceeding comes to being a full trial on the merits, which is strictly
prohibited. See supra note 12.
63. Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D.D.C. 1979) (extradition request by
Italian government on charges of homicide and robbery).
64. Id. This is of course, in addition to determining whether the offense charged is
extraditable under the treaty, and whether the person brought before the court is the one
accused of the crime. See supra note 8.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). See supra note 21 for text of statute.
66. See supra note 62. The court's appraoch in Charlton is apparently to examine
whether the evidence sustains the extradition, not whether the charge is sustained. Such a
reading is not justified by the language of the statute.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976). See supra note 21 for text of statute.
68. See Treaty, supra note 1, at Schedule annexed to Treaty. The schedule of offenses is
annexed to the Treaty and lists such offenses as murder, kidnapping, extortion, counterfeit-
ing, fraud and arson. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
70. 62 F. at 996.
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In Mackin, the magistrate did not address the need for statu-
tory construction, despite the implication in Eain and Ezeta that
such construction is a necessary condition for taking jurisdiction
over political offense determinations. 7' She emphasized that Con-
gress had implicitly endorsed the courts' practice of taking jurisdic-
tion to decide the political character of offenses, 72 because "Con-
gress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change .... .73 The court inferred
that Congress intended to adopt the judicial interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 3184, that courts have jurisdiction to decide whether an
offense is of a political character, "into the plain words of the
statute."'74 Magistrate Buchwald submitted that if there were to be
any major change in the extradition process, it would be for Con-
gress to consider, and that in order to interpret the statute differ-
ently a major statutory change would be required. 75
As the government argued in Mackin, however, "the vesting of
exclusive jurisdiction to decide the 'political offense' question in the
Executive Branch does not do violence to the present extradition
statutes ...and is in keeping with the deference the courts have
traditionally and wisely paid the Executive Branch in matters of
foreign policy. 7 6 Therefore, the strained construction of section
3184 that gives the courts power to apply the political offense
exception should be discarded in favor of the view of authorities
explicitly indicating that the judiciary's role in extradition matters
is limited to a determination of probable cause. 77
II. THE TREATY
The political offense exception is set forth in Article V(1)(c) of
the Treaty on Extradition between the United States and the United
Kingdom. 78  It provides:
71. See supra notes 30-32 & 42-43 and accompanying text.
72. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 38.
73. Id. at 38 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1977)). See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361,
366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 147 (1920).
74. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc 1, p. 54, slip op. at 39.
75. Id. at 42-43.
76. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 27.
77. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
78. Treaty, supra note 1, art. V(1)(c).
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Extradition shall not be granted if ... (c)(i) the offense for
which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party
as one of a political character; or (ii) the person sought proves
that the request for his extradition has in fact been made with a
view to try or punish him for an offense of a political charac-
ter. 7
9
A. Part One of the Political Offense Exception
Although the political character of an offense has traditionally
been decided by the courts,80 there is no definition, either in the
Treaty itself or in the minutes of the Treaty negotiations, of the
"requested Party" that is to make this determination."' In Mackin,
the magistrate held that the term "requested Party" referred to the
government in general,8 2 although the government argued that the
words referred to the executive branch. 83
The magistrate in Mackin focused on the fact that the Treaty
was re-negotiated in 1969 and implied that no revision of the
79. Id.
80. See supra note 28.
81. Hannay, supra note 35, at 385.
82. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 39-40. This view is reinforced by
a reading of articles V, VI, and XI which pertain to the "territory of the requested Party" and
of articles IV, VIII and IX which pertain to the "law of the requested Party." For example,
article V(1) provides that:
Extradition shall not be granted if: (a) the person sought would, if proceeded
against in the territory of the requested Party for the offense for which his extra-
dition is requested, be entitled to be discharged on the grounds of a previous acquit-
tal or conviction in the territory of the requesting or requested Party or of a third
state ....
Treaty, supra note 1, art. V(1) (emphasis added).
Article VI provides: "If the person sought should be under examination or under
punishment in the territory of the requested Party for any other offense, his extradition shall
be deferred until the conclusion of the trial and the full execution of any punishment awarded
to him." Id. art. VI (emphasis added).
Article XI(2) provides:
If a warrant or order for the extradition of a person sought has been issued by the
competent authority and he is not removed from the territory of the requested Party
within such time as may be required under the law of that Party, he may be set at
Liberty and the requested Party may subsequently refuse to extradite him for the
same offense.
Id. art. XI(2) (emphasis added).
Article IV provides:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the
relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party
does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that
the death penalty will not be carried out.
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political offense exception was made at that time. 84  The magis-
trate also stated that there was no indication in the minutes of the
extradition negotiations between the United States and the United
Kingdom that the contracting parties intended to preclude the
judiciary from determining the applicability of the political offense
exception."5 Accordingly, she held that the contracting parties to
the Treaty would be charged with the knowledge of the way in
which the Treaty had been interpreted. 6 She reasoned that the
absence of any revision implied an intent not to change the prevail-
ing judicial interpretation regarding jurisdiction over political of-
fense determinations. 87
Interestingly, the drafters of the Treaty did change the lan-
guage of the political offense exception when they re-negotiated
Id. art. IV (emphasis added).
Article IX(1) sets forth:
Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient according to the
law of the requested Party either to justify the committal for trial of the person
sought if the offense of which he is accused had been committed in the territory of
the requested Party or to prove that he is the identical person convicted by the courts
of the requesting Party.
Id. art. IX(l) (emphasis added).
See also Article VIII, supra note 1. The phrase at issue in the above articles could not be
construed so narrowly as to refer to one branch of the government.
83. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 28. The United States is uniformly represented by the
President in matters of foreign affairs. The President is the "sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See speech of John Marshall, 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800),
reprinted in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat. app.) 26 (1820); L. HENKIN, FOamEGN AFFsAIS AND THE
CONSTITUTION, 45-50, 93 (1972). See also infra note 102.
84. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 39-40.
85. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40. Magistrate Buchwald stated:
"Absent an indication to the contrary, this Court has no basis upon which to assume that the
parties intended to change a practice of more than eighty years." Id. (footnote omitted). This
statement was based upon a reading of the "Minutes of Extradition Negotiations United
States/United Kingdom," London (October 30, 1969 and December 1-4, 1969).
86. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 39-40. Presumably, the
magistrate is relying on the supremacy clause of article VI of the Constitution "which
expressly makes treaties (along with the Constitution and federal laws) the supreme Law of
the Land." B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.16 (1979). Therefore, a treaty takes
effect as part of our law, just as a federal statute. Id.; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599
(1884). Therefore, since Congress is charged with the knowledge of the way in which a
statute is being interpreted, see supra note 73, the same holds true for a treaty. The court of
appeals supplemented the magistrate's opinion on this issue by theorizing that it is more likely
that the language was intended to preclude a requesting country from binding the requested
country with its definition of political offense or that derived from international law. 668
F.2d at 133.
87. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40.
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it, 88 contrary to statements in the opinions of the magistrate and
court of appeals.8s In the previous treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom, 90 the political offense exception
simply stated that a fugitive criminal would not be surrendered
if the crime or offense in respect of which his surrender is de-
manded is one of a political character, or if he proves that the
requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view
to try or punish him for a crime or offense of a political charac-
ter.9'
No reference was made as to which branch of the government
should determine the applicability of this exception 2
Under Article V(1)(c) of the present Treaty,9 3 the wording of
the exception is essentially the same as in the former treaty except
that the re-negotiated Treaty has been amended to say that the
"requested Party" is to decide if the offense is political in nature.9 4
To follow the magistrate's reasoning, s if the re-negotiaters of this
Treaty are charged with the knowledge of the way the Treaty had
been interpreted, it must be presumed that the drafters of the
Treaty intended a new meaning for the provision when a change in
the language was effected.98
The government argued in Mackin that this amendment
means the executive branch should determine the applicability of
the political offense provision.9 7 In light of a trend in the language
of the political offense exception in past treaties, particularly in
88. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 28 n. *. See infra notes 90-94.
89. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40; 668 F.2d at 132-33. The
magistrate relied on the absence of discussion in the "Minutes of Extradition Negotiations" to
demonstrate that there was no dissatisfaction with the way the earlier treaty was interpreted.
See In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40. See also supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
90. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 22, 1931, United States-Great Britain, 47 Stat. 2122,
T.S. No. 849.
91. Id. at art. 6.
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying note 79.
94. Id.
95. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40. See supra note 85.
96. See generally Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1947); Greci v. Birkens, 527
F.2d 956, 958-59 (1st Cir. 1976) (changes made in standard language previously used in
extradition treaties were held to signify that a new interpretation was intended).
97. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 18. The government interpreted the addition of
"requested Party" as calling for the subjective opinion of the executive branch, i.e., that of
the Secretary of State. Id. n. *.
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those treaties entered into force within the last twenty years, the
government's view appears correct.98 The trend has been one mov-
ing away from judicial determination of the political offense excep-
tion and toward executive resolution of the issue.99 Over the years,
the drafters of treaties have replaced terms such as "judicial author-
98. In surveying the 93 extradition treaties between the United States and foreign
governments, dating back to 1856, a pattern in the language of the political offense exception
can be discerned. See 28 U.S.C. § 3181 for a list of the nations with which the United States
has entered into bilateral extradition treaties. For example, in the treaty with Argentina,
signed on September 26, 1896, the provision concerning political offenses stated: "In cases of
doubt with relation to the present article, the decision of the judicial authorities of the
country to which the demand for extradition is directed will be final." Treaty on Extradition,
Sept. 26, 1896, United States-Argentina, art. 6, 31 Stat. 1883, 1887, T.S. No. 6. This
language clearly confers jurisdiction on the courts to determine whether a political offense
has been committed. When the contracting parties to the treaty re-negotiated it in 1972, they
deleted the language mandating judicial decision regarding political offenses and gave juris-
diction to "competent authorities of the requested Party." Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21,
1972, United States-Argentina, art. 7(2), 23 U.S.T. 3501, 3509-10, T.I.A.S. No. 7510.
In the treaties drafted in the first decade of the 1900's, the issue of political offense was to
be decided by the "authorities of the government" on which the demand for surrender was
made. The drafters of these treaties distinctly omitted any specific reference to the courts.
See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, art. VI, 37 Stat. 1526,
1530, T.S. No. 561; Treaty on Extradition, May 14, 1900, United States-Switzerland, art.
VII, 31 Stat. 1928, 1932, T.S. No. 354; Treaty on Extradition, Apr. 21, 1900, United States-
Bolivia, art. VI, 32 Stat. 1857, 1860-61, T.S. No. 399. Furthermore, "authorities of the
government" is suggestive of the executive branch, as asserted by Judge Friendly in the
opinion of the court of appeals in Mackin. See infra note 101.
The treaties drafted in the next two decades of this century contain language in the
political offense exception which is ambivalent. The provisions declare that "[t]he state
applied to, or courts of such State, shall decide whether the crime or offense is of a political
character." See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 1, 1933, United States-Albania, art. III, 49
Stat. 3313, 3316-17, T.S. No. 902; Treaty on Extradition, May 6, 1931, United States-
Greece, art. III, 47 Stat. 2185, 2189-90, T.S. No. 855; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 31, 1930,
United States-Austria, art. III, 46 Stat. 2779, 2783, T.S. No. 822; Treaty on Extradition, July
2, 1925, United States-Czechoslovakia, art. III, 44 Stat. 2367, 2371, T.S. No. 734. This seems
to be a step backward in establishing a trend. However, this ambivalence does not appear in
treaties drafted in the recent decades.
Treaties executed in the 1960's and 1970's use language similar to that found in the treaty
with Brazil which provides: "The determination of the character of the crime or offense will
fall exclusively to the authorities of the requested State." Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 13,
1961, United States-Brazil, art. V(6)(c), 15 U.S.T. 2093, 2100, T.I.A.S. No. 5691. Reference
to "authorities of the State" is even more suggestive of the executive branch than the phrase
"requested Party," see infra note 101 and accompanying text, at issue in the present case. See
Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, art. VI(5), 26 U.S.T. 493, 499,
T.I.A.S. No. 8052; Treaty on Extradition, June 22, 1972, United States-Denmark, art. 7(4),
25 U.S.T. 1293, 1301, T.I.A.S. No. 7864; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United
States-Argentina, art. 7(2), 23 U.S.T. 3501, 3509-10, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Treaty on Extradi-
tion, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, art. 4(1)(iii), 27 U.S.T. 983, 988, T.I.A.S. No.
8237.
99. See infra notes 100-04.
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ities,"' 100 which very clearly gave jurisdiction over the political
offense exception to the judiciary, with phrases such as "authorities
of the government" 'land "requested Party," which more clearly
denote the executive branch.102  This trend culminated in the re-
cent extradition treaty entered into by the United States with Mex-
ico.l0 3  In that treaty, the political offense exception explicitly sets
forth that the "executive authority of the requested Party shall
decide" the applicability of the exception. 10 4  In view of the trend,
it appears that the change in the language previously used in extra-
dition treaties was intended to signify that a new interpretation of
the exception is in order.105
The court of appeals in Mackin indicated that, although the
political offense exception should be handled in a uniform man-
100. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Sept. 26, 1896, United States-Argentina, 31 Stat.
1883, T.S. No. 6. See supra note 98.
101. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 13, 1961, United States-Brazil, 15 U.S.T.
2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691. See supra note 98. Support for this view, although qualified, may
be found in Judge Friendly's statement in Mackin that, "reference to the 'authorities' of the
United States Government is more suggestive of the executive branch than is the broader
phrase 'requested Party' at issue in this case. ... 668 F.2d at 133.
102. When the term "requested Party" is used without words of qualification such as
"territory of' [the requested Party], it generally refers to the executive branch. Cf. supra note
82. This interpretation is reinforced by a reading of articles IV, V, X, XI, XIII and XIV. For
example, article XI provides: "The requested Party shall promptly communicate to the
requesting Party through the diplomatic channel the decision on the request for extradition."
Article XIII provides:
When a request for extradition is granted, the requested Party shall. . . furnish the
requesting Party with all sums of money and other articles- (a) which may serve as
proof of the offense to which the request relates; or (b) which may have been
acquired by the person sought as a result of the offense and are in his possession.
Article XIV provides: "The requested Party shall make all necessary arrangements for and
meet the cost of the representation of the requesting Party in any proceedings arising out of a
request for extradition."
In each of these articles, in which the term "requested Party" is used alone, the
governmental function to be carried out appears to be one more appropriately handled by the
executive branch. See also articles IV, V, & X. The sole exception to this rule appears in
article IX(2) which states: "If the requested Party requires additional evidence or information
to enable a decision to be taken on the request for extradition, such evidence or information
shall be submitted within such time as that Party shall require." In this case, the term
"requested Party," by itself, is ambiguous. Moreover, since the contracting parties to the
Treaty are the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, as set forth in the
introductory paragraph of the Treaty, it appears that reference to the "requested Party" or
"requesting Party" would indicate the contracting parties.
103. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (entered into force Jan. 25, 1980).
104. Id. at art. 5(1). The provision states: "If any question arises as to the application of
the foregoing paragraph [political and military offenses], the Executive authority of the
requested Party shall decide." Id.
105. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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ner, 106 it would be impossible to re-negotiate every extradition
treaty which is still in force in a short amount of time so as to make
the language of the political offense exception identical in each
treaty. It is not impossible, however, to apply the exception consist-
ently.107  It is entirely appropriate for courts to interpret the intent
of the negotiators of the Treaty. Ambiguities could be resolved by
taking into account the intent evidenced by the trend in the most
recent treaties. This analysis would obviate the need for legislation
to solve the dilemma posed by the conflicting language of the
political offense exception in different treaties. Such legislation is
now being contemplated by Congress through Senate Bill S. 1639,
entitled "Extradition Act of 1981."108 The bill provides that the
Secretary of State alone shall have jurisdiction to decide the appli-
cability of the political offense exception to extradition. 09
B. Part Two of the Political Offense Exception
In construing Article V(1)(c)(ii) of the Treaty, and similar
provisions in treaties with other foreign countries, courts have uni-
formly held that an inquiry into the motivation of the country
requesting extradition can only be made by the Secretary of
State." 0  The seminal case on this point is In re Lincoln,"' in
106. See infra note 107.
107. Such consistency is desirable, for as Judge Friendly stated in Mackin:
[This court is] unable to envision any [reason] ... the courts should determine
political offense questions under some treaties, but not under others. If the State
Department had wanted to change the rule reflected in the above treaties ...it
would hardly have done so on a piecemeal basis in treaties with individual foreign
states and without disclosing its intention to the Senate.
668 F.2d at 133.
108. S. 1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. § 9952-60 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981).
109. Id. Section 3194(a) and § 3916(a)(3) of S. 1639 provide the Secretary of State with
sole jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the political offense exception. Section 3194(a)
provides that the court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether extradition is sought
for a political offense or because of the person's political beliefs and § 3196(a) (3) specifies that
the Secretary of State has the authority to decline to order the surrender of a person if he is
persuaded that the person's extradition is sought for one of these reasons. Id.
110. See Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1932); In re
Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 694
(S.D.N.Y.), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 867 (D. Conn. 1959), affd, 278 F.2d
77 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915),
aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916).
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which the petitioner claimed that the British government requested
his extradition, not for the crime charged in the complaint, but
because it desired to punish him and to prevent him from making
further public statements in the United States against the British
government." 2  Stated otherwise, the government of Great Britain
used the crime of forgery as a subterfuge to punish Lincoln for his
political action. The district court held that it was "not a part of the
court proceedings nor of the hearing upon the charge of crime to
exercise discretion as to whether the criminal charge is a cloak for
political action, nor whether the request is made in good faith."1 13
The court indicated that "[s]uch matters should be left to the
Department of State."'" 4
Thus, it is well-settled that the applicability of Article
V(1)(c)(ii) is a matter left solely to the discretion of the executive
branch." 5  The issue created by this rule is whether the executive
branch should decide the applicability of the political offense excep-
111. 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916) (extradition
request by the government of the United Kingdom charging the fugitive with forgery and
obtaining money on false pretenses).
112. Id. at 73-74.
113. Id. at 74. The court further stated:
It is thought by the court that application to the Secretary of State of the United
States will furnish full protection against the delivery of the accused to any govern-
ment which will not live up to its treaty obligations, and that the Secretary of State
will be fully satisfied (before delivering the accused to the demanding government)
that he is wanted (in the legal sense of that term) upon a criminal charge, that it is
not sought to secure him from a country upon which he is depending as an asylum
because of political matters, and that the treaty is not actually used as a subterfuge.
Id. Many cases are in accord. See supra note 110. For example, in a recent case, an Italian
national was ordered extradited to Italy to face charges of fraudulent bankruptcy. He
contended that the request for extradition was politically motivated in that he was being
sought in order to be punished for his political beliefs. The district court held that the motives
of the requesting country are not within the jurisdiction of the court but reserved for the
province of the Secretary of State. In habeas corpus proceedings before the district court and
court of appeals the same decision was reached. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.),
habeas corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afJ'd,
619 F.2d 167, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1980).
In Garcia-Guilern v. United States, the petitioner was a former Director General of the
Ministry of Education in Peru who was charged with embezzlement. He claimed that he
would be charged and tried in Peru for other crimes wholly distinct and unrelated to the
crime of embezzlement (which was charged in the original extradition complaint). The court
stated that it was not permitted to inquire into the procedure which awaited the petitioner
upon his return to Peru. The court held that such matters were left to the State Department,
which would ultimately determine whether to surrender the petitioner to the Peruvian
government. 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971).
114. 228 F. at 74.
115. See supra note 110.
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tion in some cases, but not in others. In sustaining Magistrate
Buchwald's opinion, 1 8 the court of appeals in Mackin relied on
Eain v. Wilkes, " 7 to hold that the different approaches taken on the
political offense and subterfuge issues are not contradictory." 8 The
Eain court stated that to make the determination that an offense is
of a political character, it need only look at past facts relating to
whether violent political activity was unfolding at the time to
which the facts relate, and to the individual's recognizable connec-
tion to that violence.' ' 9 The Eain court contrasted this determina-
tion of past political fact with the assessment which must be made
concerning the motivation of the country requesting extradition. It
reasoned that this issue of motivation clearly involves the conduct of
our country's foreign relations and, therefore, is a matter best left to
the Executive's discretion.12 0
The distinction, however, does not provide an entirely valid
basis for dividing jurisdiction on the political offense issue. It is
difficult to envision any reason why the executive branch should
determine political offense questions in some cases and not in oth-
ers 121 when the issues raised under both parts of the political offense
exception are "usually intertwined." 2 2  Consequently, having the
court decide the political character of the offense and the executive
116. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 39.
117. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
118. 668 F.2d at 133.
119. 641 F.2d at 516.
120. Id.
121. 127 CONC. REc. S9952-60, S9956 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981)[hereinafter cited as
CoNC. REc.].
122. Id. at S9956. In a situation where the crime is purely non-political, such as the
forgery in Sindona or embezzlement in Garcia-Guillern, see supra note 113, the subterfuge
issue seems entirely distinct from determination of the political character of the offense
charged. When, however, the crime charged is of the same nature as, or related to, those
which the extraditee would claim are the actual targets of the extradition request, the
differentiation between the roles of the judiciary and the executive branch is not at all clear.
At present, under part one of the political offense exception, courts determine the political
character of the offense charged in the extradition request by looking at the presence of a
political uprising at the time of the alleged crime, the membership of the extraditee in any
political groups, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 516, and whether the alleged crime was
committed in furtherance of the uprising. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 155. Under part
two of the political offense exception, the Secretary of State must make the very same
determinations with respect to similar or related charges that the extraditee claims are the
true objects behind the subterfuge of the extradition request. In such cases, there is a high
probability of overlap between the facts considered and the conclusions drawn by both the
court and the Secretary of State. The possibility of inconsistency is therefore undeniable. See
infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
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branch decide whether the requesting Party has sought extradition
with a view to try or punish the fugitive for an offense of a political
character may often lead to "inconsistent results."12 3
III. POLITICAL QUESTION
To decide the political offense issue, 24 the magistrate in
Mackin analyzed the facts regarding the existence of violent politi-
cal activity and Mackin's connection to that activity.125  The magis-
trate's ultimate determination was threefold. Magistrate Buchwald
held that: (1) there was a political uprising at the time and site of
the commission of the offense; 2 6 (2) Mackin was a member of the
uprising group; 17 and (3) the offense was "incidental to"' 28 and "in
furtherance of"' 29 the political uprising. As the government argued,
the magistrate's decision to consider these factors raises serious
123. CONG. REC., supra note 121, at S9956. See supra note 122.
124. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 45. The first judicial attempt to
define "political character" of an offense was in the decision of In re Castioni, [18911 1 Q.B.
149. The court created a two-part test to aid in the determination of whether an offense is
political in nature; first, there must be a political disturbance at the time of the offense; and
second, the offense must constitute an overt act incidental to or part of the political distur-
bance. Id. at 159 (Denman, J.). This approach is still followed in the United States today. See
Lubet & Czackes, supra note 62, at 203; Garcia-Mora, supra note 12, at 1244.
125. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 49-91.
126. Id. at 83. "[T]he Court conclude[d] that there was a political conflict in
Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland in March of 1978 which was part of an ongoing
political uprising, fluctuating in intensity, but nevertheless of sufficient severity to satisfy the
first prong of the political offense exception." Id.
127. Id. at 85. "[The] Court conclude[d] that Desmond Mackin has unquestionably
sustained his burden of proof in establishing his long standing commitment to the Republican
Movement and his membership in the PIRA on March 16, 1978, the date of the offense
charged in the extradition papers." Id.
128. Id. at 95.
In so far as the exception requires that the act be "incidental to" a severe political
disturbance and to the extent that this has been interpreted to require some degree
of contemporaneity between the commission of the act and the political uprising we
rely on our discussion above regarding the history and past decade of political
violence in Northern Ireland. Based on that discussion this Court has already
concluded that there was a political uprising in Andersonstown on March 16, 1978.
Id. at 95-96.
129. Id. at 98. "[W]hile this one act could not possibly bring to fruition the goals of the
PIRA, it was undoubtedly free from personal motive and substantially linked to the tradi-
tional goal and strategy of the IRA and PIRA: an independent Ireland, free from British rule
through the use of violence." Id.
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constitutional issues with respect to the political question doc-
trine.130
The political question doctrine' 3 ' requires the judiciary to re-
frain from deciding questions deemed political because the Consti-
tution has committed their resolution to another branch of the
federal government.132  Historically, authority over the conduct of
foreign affairs has been vested in the executive branch as a result of
the judiciary's broad interpretation of the powers granted to the
President under Article II of the Constitution. 133 The Supreme
Court listed six criteria to assist in identifying a political question,
in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr. 134  The presence of any one
130. Gov. Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 7, at 48. See infra notes 131-33 and
accompanying text.
131. The political question doctrine is not set forth in the Constitution, but is judicially
created. L. HENICN, supra note 83, at 215. See infra note 132.
132. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); United States v. Palmer, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
The political-question doctrine has had its greatest scope in the area of external
relations. In many ways, the very purpose of the doctrine is to emphasize political
autonomy in foreign affairs. The conduct of foreign relations, declared the Supreme
Court, at the outset, involves "considerations of policy, considerations of extreme
magnitude, and certainly, entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a
court of justice."
B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.19 (1979) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 260 (1796)).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Eain v. Wilkes stated that "[t]he government
does not direct our attention to a specific constitutional provision that could be invoked to
guide a resolution of this issue. ... 641 F.2d at 514. This is not necessary, however, since
the power of the nation in the field of foreign affairs is not restricted to the specific grants of
the constitution. "In that field, federal authority stems from the very existence of the United
States as an independent country." B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at § 5.13. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936).
133. The President has the power to receive and appoint Ambassadors, to make Trea-
ties, and to declare war as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. U.S. CONST. art. II.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 741-42 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Hirabay-
ashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 309 (1936). Contra Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 132, at §
5.13 (1979); L. HENKIN, supra note 83, at 45-54.
134. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1]
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
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factor is sufficient to constitute an improper exercise of power by
the court in violation of the Constitution. 35  The government con-
tended that three of these six applied in the Mackin case. 36  The
applicable factors are:
1. The issue cannot be resolved without an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
2. Multiple pronouncements on the same issue by more than one
branch of the government could potentially embarrass our
government.
3. The issue does not lend itself to resolution through judicially
discoverable and manageable standards.1 37
The government asserted that the magistrate's determination of
whether there was a political uprising at the time and site of the
commission of the offense directly contravened the principle ex-
pressed in each of these factors. 138
due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
Considering the factors in Baker, Professor Tribe discussed three theories concerning the
relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government. The first Baker
factor encompasses the classical view which imposes on the court the requirement of deciding
all cases and issues before it unless the court finds that the Constitution itself has vested the
determination of the issue in another branch of the government. The second two factors
follow the functional approach, under which the court considers such factors as the difficul-
ties in gaining judicial access to relevant information, the need for uniformity of decision, and
the responsibilities of the other branches of government, when determining whether or not to
decide a certain issue. The last three factors look toward the prudential view, under which
the court treats the political question doctrine as a means to avoid passing on the merits of a
question, when reaching the merits would force the court to compromise an important
principle or would undermine the court's authority. L. TMBE, AMEMCAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 71, 72 n.1 (1978). See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1965-66)(discussing the competing theories of judicial
review).
135. 369 U.S. at 217.
136. Gov. Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 7, at 50. This determination violates
another Baker v. Cart factor, namely, that the issue does not lend itself to resolution through
judicially discoverable and manageable standards. This is because the "incidental to" and "in
furtherance" tests have been applied in a flexible manner, which has led to incongruous
results. The reason for this inconsistency is the lack of truly objective criteria to determine
political offenses. The courts freely interpret the political offense phrase on a case by case
basis, resulting in many possible readings of the present state of the law. Cantrell, supra note
12, at 789. See Scharpf, supra note 134, at 567-73.
137. Gov. Post Trial Memorandum, supra note 7, at 50.
138. Id.
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The magistrate and the court of appeals rejected the political
question argument.13 9  " 'It is error,' " quoted the court of appeals,
" 'to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.' 140 The court of ap-
peals declared that it was clear the courts have the authority to
construe treaties and may find that they provide the answer to
issues raised under them.14
A. Issue Requiring Nonjudicial Policy Determination
The magistrate in Mackin rejected the claim that the determi-
nation of a political uprising in Northern Ireland involved a policy
determination "of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion."'' 42
Magistrate Buchwald submitted that the determination relates only
to the past political fact of whether a political revolt existed at the
time and site of the alleged crime, and not to a consideration of the
present political climate of the requesting country. 43  In Magis-
trate Buchwald's view, only a determination of the isolated issue
relating to whether "there occurred violent acts and political ten-
sions that resulted in the charged criminal acts" was required. 44
The government had submitted that only the executive branch
has the authority to determine and recognize the political condi-
tions which exist on foreign soil, including whether a state of war,
belligerency or insurrection exists on a certain date. 4 5 The govern-
ment relied upon the Supreme Court's opinion in The Three
Friends, 46 in which the Court noted the distinction between "rec-
ognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political
revolt, between recognition of the existence of war in a material
139. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 40-42; 668 F.2d at 137.
140. 668 F.2d at 137 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211-12).
141. 668 F.2d at 137.
142. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 41 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. at 217).
143. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 41. In Magistrate Buchwald's
words: "[T]he Courts are not being called upon to make delicate foreign policy decisions, to
debate the political climate in a certain country, or to pass judgment on the merits or
demerits of the political affairs of another nation." In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54,
slip op. at 42.
144. Id. (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 515).
145. Cov. Brief, supra note 14, at 33. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253
(1897); The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1897); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 499 (1892).
146. 166 U.S. 1 (1897). The Three Friends involved a seizure of a vessel that had been
armed for the purpose of serving a revolutionary group engaged in armed resistance to the
government of the King of Spain, on the island of Cuba. Id. at 2.
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sense and of war in a legal sense . . "147 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that it belonged to the political department to
determine when a state of belligerency or insurrectionary warfare
existed. 148
The magistrate also quoted a legal commentary which stated
that judicial determination of the issue was appropriate because it
"'permits the Executive Branch to remove itself from political and
economic sanctions which might result if other nations believe the
United States lax in the enforcement of its treaty obligations."'
' 49
This rationale, however, of protecting the executive branch from
the consequences of its own decisions, not only implies a direct
usurpation of the responsibilities of the executive branch, but also
indicates recognition of the inherent political nature of the prob-
lem.
As the government stressed in Mackin, a court is not the appro-
priate forum 50 for careful analysis of a friendly foreign country's
intentions, political system,1 51 or complex internal political strug-
gles.' 52 Such careful analysis is required, despite the magistrate's
questionable contention in Mackin that the determination of
whether "there occurred violent acts and political tensions that
resulted in the charged criminal acts" 5 3 involved only an "isolated
issue. " A more informed decision would be made by the execu-
147. Id. at 63-64. The existence of a condition of war is to be determined by the political
department of the federal government and the courts must take judicial notice of this
determination. In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455, 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); Verana v. De
Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954, 954 (M.D. Pa. 1941).
148. 166 U.S. at 63-64.
149. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42 (citing Lubet & Czackes,
supra note 62, at 200). Although the magistrate quoted this statement, she stated that she did
not necessarily endorse this view. Id.
150. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 34.
151. CONe. REC., supra note 121, at S9956.
152. Hannay, supra note 35, at 411.
153. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42 (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d at 515).
154. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42. In determining this "isolated
issue," id., "Magistrate Buchwald found it necessary to go far beyond the facts supporting the
extradition request," Gov. Brief, supra note 13, at 31, to determine the political character of
the offense. The magistrate received evidence concerning "the history of English-Irish rela-
tions, the level of violence in Northern Ireland, the British legal and military response to the
efforts of the IRA, the position of the government of the United Kingdom with regard to the
European Convention on Human Rights, and a broad range of other matters." Id. The
hearing took seven days and a transcript of the hearing covered 1621 pages. In re Mackin, No.
80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 4.
The century-old political struggle in Northern Ireland would provide an objective basis
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tive branch since it has expertise in evaluating sensitive interna-
tional situations.155  The Supreme Court recognized in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp. 156 that decisions affecting
foreign policy call for a large element of prophecy and that the
judiciary does not have the aptitude, facilities or responsibility to
make this type of delicate and complex resolution. 15 7
There is also danger in vesting this decision-making authority
in the judiciary. 58  A court "might lack the expertise to determine
the political or nonpolitical nature of an offense arising in an intri-
cate international fact situation. This danger is especially acute
with respect to cases involving terrorists because of the complex and
ambiguous interplay between their avowed goals and actual con-
duct."' Because the Executive cannot review a judicial determi-
for the belief that it was reasonably simple to determine that there was a political uprising at
the time of the alleged crime. Yet the magistrate wrote a 101-page opinion covering a
discussion of the political and historical heritage of Northern Ireland, a treatment of
the religious underpinnings of the historical and current disturbances there, passing
references to supposed abuses by various authorities, a lengthy discussion of the
general level of violence in Northern Ireland, allusions to British legal procedures for
the prosecution of suspected terrorists, an assessment of the support for IRA activi-
ties within the Catholic community at large, and a host of related topics.
Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 31-32. If the question of whether there were a political uprising
in a foreign country were not as clear as it is in Ireland, the factual determination would be
unwieldy in light of the broad range of matters which would require consideration.
155. See Hannay, supra note 35, at 411.
156. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). The President had approved of certain orders of the Civil
Aeronautics Board granting and denying certificates authorizing certain American air carri-
ers to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation. Waterman, who was denied a
certificate by the Board, sought judicial review of that decision. The Court recognized that
since the President's power extends to foreign affairs and foreign commerce, this decision was
not subject to judicial review. Id. at 111.
157. Id. The Court further stated:
[T]he very nature of ecutive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments
of the government, Ecutive and Legislative . . . . They are and should be under-
taken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id.
158. Lubet & Czackes, supra note 62, at 200.
159. Id. The magistrate conceded that "modern international political affairs are be-
coming increasingly complex and correspondingly, that the number of 'hard' cases in which
the 'political offense' exception may be raised is likely to increase." In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr.
Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 42. She also expressed concern that "the political offense exception
should not be applied so as to create a safe haven for terrorists in the United States." Id. at 99.
Yet she adhered to precedent permitting judicial determination of the political offense
exception. Id. at 42-43.
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nation of non-extradition, 60 the courts are bound to take into con-
sideration international and domestic reaction to their decisions.16 1
Furthermore, the demonstrated undesirability of judicial determi-
nation is complemented by the advantage of granting to the execu-
tive branch jurisdiction to decide the issue. For example, if the
executive branch does not refuse extradition, but is not completely
satisfied with the consequences of the fugitive's return, it may
attach certain conditions to his surrender.16 2
160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
161. It has been theorized by legal commentators that the courts are heavily influenced
by the political viewpoint of the requesting country, in determining the applicability of the
political offense exception. If the requesting country has attitudes similar to that of the
United States, the courts will lean toward extradition of the fugitive, whereas if the request-
ing country has unacceptable political standards, the courts will not extradite the fugitive.
Hannay, supra note 35, at 394-97; Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in
Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 68-74 (1979).
For example, in United States v. Artukovic, which went up and down the federal courts
for a decade, the Yugoslavian government sought the extradition of Artukovic, Minister of the
Interior, for the alleged murder of thousands of civilians in concentration camps during
World War II. The district court rejected extradition due to the political character of the
offenses. The circuit court affirmed this decision. The case went to the Supreme Court which
reversed on the procedural point that there had never been a magistrate's hearing as required
by statute. Finally, the magistrate denied extradition on the ground that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Ivancevic v. Artukovic,
211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818, reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954), on
remand sub nom. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393
(1958)(mem.), on remand sub nom. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal.
1959). As one commentator postulates:
[A] fair reading of the opinions in the case leaves one with a strong suspicion that the
federal courts in California were more heavily influenced by the Cold War and the
fact that the request for extradition of Artukovic was made by a Communist
country, than they were by the merits of the charges against him.
Hannay, supra note 35, at 394 (footnote omitted).
Another writer explains the court's decision against extradition in Artukovic as an
additional illustration of the judiciary's tendency to "exclude from extradition those whose
political motivation is deemed worthy but whose acts may not fall within the original
definition of the exception." Epps, supra, at 71. Her suspicion is that the courts took into
consideration the fact that the new regime in Yugoslavia was not within the "Western
capitalist tradition" and that, therefore, extradition was not granted. Id. at 72.
Hannay believes that the decision to deny the extradition of two Cubans to the Castro
government in Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959), was also influenced by anti-
Communism. Hannay, supra note 35, at 396. Epps suggests that because the court had little
incentive to return the fugitives to the alien government it expanded the political offense
exception to prevent the surrender of the fugitives to a politically hostile country. Epps,
supra, at 72-73.
162. I.A. SHERER, ExrAnrIxoN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1971). See, e.g., Jimenez
v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962) (the Department of State secured a written
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As the government contended in Mackin, the magistrate's find-
ing of a political uprising involved an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, thus bringing her finding
within the purview of the political question doctrine. 16 3  This de-
termination should, therefore, be reserved to the discretion of the
executive branch, based on the President's primary responsibility
for the conduct of United States foreign affairs. 6 4
B. Potential Embarrassment Due to Multiple Pronouncements
A second constitutional problem is raised by the potential
embarrassment of the United States government as a result of multi-
ple pronouncements on the same issue by more than one branch of
the government.16 5 The court of appeals in Mackin dismissed this
issue by claiming that if the decision were to be placed solely within
the discretion of the executive branch, it might heighten difficulties
concerning foreign relations. 16 According to the treatise cited by
the court, if the executive branch determines that the fugitive has
committed a political offense which is not extraditable, that deter-
mination necessarily implies an unfavorable comment on the moti-
vation of the requesting government or on the standards of justice
prevailing in that country. 1 7  The executive branch would, there-
fore, be put at a diplomatic disadvantage by taking direct responsi-
bility for decisions which may question the good faith of a foreign
government. 68 Conversely, if the judiciary makes the decision
that the political offense exception applies in a particular case, the
treatise indicates that the executive branch is spared much embar-
rassment in its subsequent dealings with the unsuccessful requesting
government. 69
assurance from the government of Venezuela regarding security measures and procedural due
process before ordering extradition). Id. An additional policy argument that neither court
made in Mackin is that the rights of an individual are at stake. In order to assure that there is
adequate protection of these rights, it would seem reasonable that courts would make an
initial finding of extraditability. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 516; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478
F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973). But one commentator states
that it is doubtful that courts are actually guided by humanitarian concern for the offender.
Cantrell, supra note 12, at 783.
163. 369 U.S. at 217.
164. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
165. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
166. 668 F.2d at 133.
167. Id. (citing I. A. SHARa, supra note 162, at 192).
168. I. A. SHEARER, supra note 162, at 198.
169. Id. at 192. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896), Mexico had sought the
extradition of Ruiz for murder, arson, robbery and kidnapping. Id. at 506-07. Allegedly,
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Under present case law, however, "the courts generally shun
deciding whether the foreign government's extradition request is
politically motivated, preferring to leave that decision to the Execu-
tive branch." 170  As stated earlier, the issues involved in determin-
ing the applicability of the political offense exception under both
parts of the political offense provision may often be intertwined.171
Therefore, the possibility of multiple and conflicting pronounce-
ments on extradition matters casts doubt on the constitutionality,
under Baker v. Carr, of dividing jurisdiction between the two
branches.17 2
C. Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards
The magistrate, in determining whether there was a political
uprising at the time and site of the commission of the offense,
undertook a study on the historical, political, military, religious
and sociological aspects of the dispute in Northern Ireland. 73 In
response to the government's claim that the issue does not lend itself
to resolution through judicially discoverable and manageable
standards, the magistrate and court of appeals agreed that the State
Department is free to share its up-to-date information on the politi-
cal situation in a foreign country with the court in the course of
extradition proceedings. 174 If the information is especially sensitive
in nature, then in camera review is available. 175
Ruiz and a group of men, whose avowed purpose was to fight the Mexican government,
crossed the border from Texas to Mexico and attacked a band of 40 Mexican soldiers. The
Ruiz group remained in Mexico for about six hours and then returned to Texas. Id. at 510.
The commissioner ordered his extradition but the district court reversed, id. at 511, holding
that the crimes were political offenses. The Supreme Court reversed, id. at 512, and granted
extradition. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court may have refused to reverse the
commissioner's decision to extradite the fugitive partly because of political considerations.
Epps, supra note 161, at 70. The Secretary of State had already expressed his view, in a letter
to the Minister of Mexico, that the offenses were not purely political. 161 U.S. at 511.
"Presumably, the Court did not want to embarrass the executive to which friendly relations
with Mexico were of more importance at that juncture than giving refuge to a few quasi-
revolutionaries." Epps, supra note 161, at 70.
170. CONG. BEc., supra note 121, at S9956 (footnote omitted). See supra note 110.
171. See supra note 122 and accompanying text,
172. In addition, with the present two-step system, if the courts determine that the
fugitive is extraditable and the ecutive reverses that decision, the requesting state is likely to
be irate. Epps, supra note 161, at 84.
173. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 35; In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at
49-90. See supra note 154.
174. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 41; 668 F.2d at 134 (citing Eain
v.Wiikes, 641 F.2d at 514-15).
175. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. at 41; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at
514-15, cited in In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 134.
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On the other hand, as the government asserted, only the execu-
tive branch has the available sources to provide complete, accurate
and up-to-date information on the political situation in a foreign
country.' 76  Although the State Department is free to share that
information with the court in the course of extradition proceedings,
secrecy and caution are of the utmost importance to national secur-
tity, and premature disclosure of confidential information could
lead to harmful results.' 77  The executive branch also has a privi-
lege to withhold certain foreign affairs information from the courts
by applying the "state secret doctrine." 78  The scope of this doc-
trine is limited to nondisclosure of matters relating to international
relations, military affairs, and public security.' 79  Furthermore,
with the decision in the hands of the executive branch, the determi-
nation may be made based on "information supplied by the fugitive
which could not be received as admissible evidence by the courts
because of evidentiary rules or procedures." 1 80 Given these condi-
tions, the court's ability to gather all data relevant to determination
of the issue would seem to be irremediably inferior to that of the
executive branch,' 8' which indicates that the political offense issue
does not lend itself to resolution through judicially discoverable and
manageable standards.
176. Gov. Brief, supra note 14, at 34.
177. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
178. Baldwin, The Foreign Affairs Advice Privilege, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 16, 22-23
(1976).
179. Id. at 22 n.17. Baldwin asserts:
The judicially sanctioned withholding of executive information based on a state
secret doctrine illustrates three points. First, the courts defer to the opinion of
executive departments on the need for confidentiality. Second, courts recognize the
executive branch's responsibility for international relations. Third, courts confirm
that public interest in confidentiality prevails despite the presumed relevance of the
evidence to the court.
Id. at 23.
180. I. A. SHEAm, supra note 162, at 192.
181. Scharpf, supra note 134, at 567. A further problem is raised merely by the fact that
the concept of "political offense" has never been defined by the drafters of treaties or by the
legislature, so there is no judicially manageable standard to determine the issue. Gov. Brief,
supra note 13, at 34-35. As stated in United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal.
1959), " 'political character' or political offense has not been too satisfactorily defined." Id. at
392. Lord Denman observed in In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, that it was not "necessary
or desirable . . . to put into language in the shape of an exhaustive definition exactly the
whole state of things, or every state of things which might bring a particular case within the
description of an offense of a political character." Id. at 155. Legal scholars have had the
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CONCLUSION
The issue of whether the judicial or the executive branch
should decide the applicability of the political offense exception is
clouded with uncertainty. It appears that the language of both the
applicable statute and the Treaty could be interpreted quite reason-
ably as requiring determination of the issue by the executive
branch. Any lingering doubt as to whether such interpretation is
correct should be dispelled when the political question doctrine is
included in the consideration. Violation of three of the six factors in
Baker v. Carr occurs when the judiciary decides the issue, and this
unconstitutionality dictates withdrawal from the judiciary of any
colorable claim to jurisdiction.
Legislation such as the recently proposed Senate bill that
grants to the executive branch jurisdiction over political offense
determinations would resolve the dilemma. The proposed bill
would codify the interpretations of the exception arguably contem-
plated by the drafters of the extradition statute and Treaty now in
effect, and would preclude future repetitious and time-consuming
litigation on the issue. Furthermore, and of paramount impor-
tance, such decisive congressional action would eliminate the cur-
rent conflict with the political question doctrine, thereby fostering
long-overdue compliance with the mandates of the United States
Constitution.
Maria P. Imbalzano
same difficulty in defining this concept. See, e.g., Cantrell, supra note 12, at 816; Garcia-
Mora, supra note 12, at 1226-27. Garcia-Mora states: "[No uniform criterion exists in
regards to [the concept of political offense] so vitally related to the protection of human
rights. There is therefore no fundamental agreement among governments and domestic
tribunals as to precisely what constitutes a political offense .... Id. (footnote omitted).
Due to the absence of clarity regarding what an offense of a political character encom-
passes, the courts have been flexible in applying the political offense exception. Epps, supra
note 161, at 68. In an area that concerns American foreign policy as deeply as does extradi-
tion, however, it is imperative that a uniform approach be developed. Lubet & Czackes,
supra note 62, at 194.
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